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Governance and Citizenship in the European Union: 
What is the White Paper on Governance Suggesting about Citizenship? 
©Jane Jenson∗ 
The White Paper on European Governance [COM(2001) 428] has provoked a good deal of dis- 
cussion, although perhaps not all that it might have or should have. It is a complex document, 
which exists in a situation itself undergoing great change. Considerations of governance are 
linked to matters of enlargement, and to the now on-going Future of Europe discussions. Release 
of the White Paper itself was followed by a process of consultation, through March 2002, that 
involved individuals and groups reacting to its principles and proposals.  
Given all to this, there is no single way to understand either the importance of the White Paper or 
even its goals. For some observers, the document represents a misunderstanding by the European 
Commission of the difference between “government”, which exists only at the national level and 
“governance” which is all that the Commission can provide, because it “works without the 
benefit of an elected government” (Sbragia, 2002: 13). For others, the report marks a move away 
from past practices, both with respect to the “Community method” and to academically identified 
“network governance”. It proposes a new form of governance: 
‘Participatory governance’ is a key term describing the outcome of one of the Prodi 
Commission's four strategic priorities – to develop a new mode of governance. Aimed at 
laying out recommendations on how to increase the legitimacy of the institutions and 
enhance democracy in Europe, the White Book raised the ‘public dialogue’ to a leading 
idea. With “public dialogue” as a new method of work the Commission not only intro-
duced a theoretical but also a practical discourse aimed at citizens in the EU (Liebert, 
2001: 9). 
And of course, for the authors of the White Paper, their notion is that the White Paper provides 
arguments for a renewal of something that already exists, the Community method. Improvements 
to the method would be made, “by following a less top-down approach and complementing its 
policy tools more effectively with non-legislative instruments.” (Commission, 2001: 4).  
This, issues of goals of action, sources of legitimacy, and policy processes are, for the authors, 
embedded in the Community method, defined (Commission, 2001: 8) as a decision-making 
process that: 
… provides a means to arbitrate between interests by passing them through two suc- 
cessive filters: the general interest at the level of the Commission; and democratic 
representation, European and national, at the level of the Council and European Parlia- 
ment, together the Union’s legislature. 
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Thus, in the White Paper, the Community method provides a way to address “one of the major 
problems confronting our societies”, that is increasing distrust of institutions and politics, as well 
as democratic institutions (“at both national and European levels”) to connect Europe with its 
citizens. It must, in other words and according to the White Paper, become a democratic method 
and respond the democratic deficit of European citizenship. 
To achieve these goals, the Community method involves the following institutions:  
• the Commission, which makes legislative and policy proposals, executes policy, is the guar- 
dian of the Treaty and represents the Community in international negotiations;  
• the Council of Ministers, representing Member states, and the European Parliament, repre- 
senting citizens, that adopt legislation and decide budgets, execution of which is entrusted to 
the Commission and national authorities 
• the European Court of Justice, that guarantees respect for the rule of law. 
This description of the Community method is not, of course, the only one available.1 Indeed, one 
of the explicit goals of the authors of the White Paper was to give a more democratic and govern- 
mental cast to the process of interest representation and decision-making at the European level of 
government, and to name it the “Community method”.2 In the description quoted here, we find 
all the classic governmental and policy functions – rule making, applying and adjudicating; 
policy initiation, decision, execution and adjudication; and so on. Indeed, the paper concludes 
with a self-description (Commission, 2001: 34-35): “The White Paper has highlighted … a 
Union based on multilevel governance” in which “the real challenge is establishing clear rules 
for how a competence is shared – not separated…”, a vision which certainly resonates with those 
of us who live in the multilevel governance world of a federal state.  
While always careful to acknowledge the importance, role and rights of “national governments” 
and “national administrations”, the White Paper also declares that “it is time to recognise that the 
Union has moved from a diplomatic to a democratic process, with policies that reach deep into 
national societies and daily life” (Commission, 2001: 30). From this perspective, it claims the 
right to enter into a democratic dialogue and foster a more open policy process with a wide range 
of actors. Focus is particularly on “a stronger interaction with regional and local governments 
and civil society”, via “a more systematic dialogue with representatives of regional and local 
governments”; flexibility in implementation of Community legislation; minimum standards for 
consultation; “partnership arrangements” for consultation beyond the minimum standards, in 
return for guarantees of representativity (Commission, 2001: 4). 
With this vision of governance expressed in the White Paper, what interpretation of citizenship 
and citizenship regimes might be applied? In the rest of this paper I do not wish to settle impor- 
tant debates about whether these recommendations should, can, or ever will be implemented in 
the EU of the 15 or an enlarged Union. Those debates are for another day. Rather, I want to 
defend the claim that with these proposals for improved governance, the authors of the White 
Paper have put forward a vision of a new citizenship regime which is very close to those being 
promoted in a number of countries, both European and non-European. This vision of a citizen- 
ship regime is one in which practices of governance stress a variety of types of actors, in which 
the formal institutions of government of the modern state play a less decisive role as well as a 
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new role, in which partnerships across sectors and levels are key governance structures, and in 
which forms of democratic participation are changing. 
In other words, I am going to use a comparative perspective to examine these proposals, and will 
demonstrate their similarities to changes occurring in the citizenship regimes of a number of 
countries. The European Union, its institutions and especially its Commission may be sui 
generis3 but the responses of actors and institutions within it, such as the group that generated the 
White Paper are not. Countries have been worried about civic disengagement for at least a de- 
cade.4 The authors of the White Paper too have been marked by the epochal debates about 
“governance,” “new public management,” new types of and roles for the state, and so on that 
have shaped thinking about citizenship, democracy and governance throughout the world in the 
last two decades. 
The hypothesis of this paper is that the proposals to alter governance practices constitute an 
example, among several, of a redesigned citizenship regime, and that in many ways the White 
Paper is positioning the EU to deploy a citizenship regime that is quite similar to those emerging 
at the country level, both in Europe and elsewhere. It is possible to do so precisely because the 
notions of “governance” play on the strengths of the EU institutions and especially the 
Commission and reduce the disadvantages of being neither fish nor fowl, neither a state nor an 
international organisation. 
In order to make my case I will present the concept of citizenship regime, and then show how the 
White Paper proposes to follow a trajectory similar to that to many national states, in its proposal 
about to re-make relations between the state and citizen and among citizens. Again, this is, in the 
case of the EU, a textual analysis, comparing one text to the historical experience of a number of 
national governments. 
The concept of citizenship regime5 
At its most general, citizenship establishes a system of inclusion and exclusion. Much analysis of 
citizenship, of course, proceeds from a narrow definition, that equates citizenship with civic and 
political rights, as well as nationality. This can be termed political citizenship. Important as it is, 
it leaves aside other aspects of citizenship which have proven to be particularly important over 
more than a century.6  
It is useful to have a concept that allows us to capture differences and to move beyond these 
assumptions. By the concept of citizenship regime we mean the institutional arrangements, rules 
and understandings that guide and shape concurrent policy decisions and expenditures of states, 
problem definitions by states and citizens, and claims-making by citizens.7 A citizenship regime 
encodes within it a paradigmatic representation of identities, of the "national" as well as the 
"model citizen", the "second-class citizen", and the non-citizen. It also encodes representations of 
the proper and legitimate social relations among and within these categories, as well as the 
borders of "public" and "private". It makes, in other words, a major contribution to the definition 
of politics which organises the boundaries of political debate and problem recognition in each 
jurisdiction.  
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There are four elements of a citizenship regime, and each contributes to setting its boundaries 
and giving content to the institutions that sustain it:  
• Citizenship involves the expression of basic values about the responsibility mix, defining the 
boundaries of state responsibilities and differentiating them from those of markets, of fami- 
lies and of communities. The result is definition of “how we wish to produce welfare”, whether 
via purchased welfare, via the reciprocity of kin, via collective support in communities, or 
via collective and public solidarity, that is state provision.8 
• Through formal recognition of particular rights and responsibilities (civic, political, social, 
and cultural; individual and collective) a citizenship regime establishes the boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion of a political community. In doing so, it identifies those entitled to 
full citizenship status and those who only, in effect, hold second-class status. Identities of 
“bearers of rights” and the “excluded” take on meaning according to these patterns, for 
example. 
• A citizenship regime also prescribes the democratic rules of the game for a polity.  Among 
these democratic rules, we include the institutional mechanisms giving access to the state, the 
modes of participation in civic life and public debates and the legitimacy of specific types of 
claims-making. The identity of full citizen and participant exists, and claims-making may 
turn to demands for better access and inclusion. 
• A citizenship regime also contributes to the definition of nation, in both the narrow passport-
holding sense of nationality and the more complicated notion of national identity and its 
geography. It thereby establishes the boundaries of belonging and the national identities 
associated with it, including those of national minorities. 
The approach adopted is one gaining favour among analysts of public policy that point to the 
effects of messages transmitted via policy design to citizens about not only their rights and res- 
ponsibilities but also their capacity to participate and be full citizens. Thus, it is a neo-institu- 
tionalist analysis that puts a good deal of emphasis on social construction of identities (ideas 
about belonging) as well as about the institutions that promote such ideas and create interests. 
For example, Ingram and Schneider (1993: 89) put it this way: “Persistent construction of certain 
classes of people as distinct types of targets imparts messages that relate to citizenship and 
participation. The unvarying experience people have with policy informs them of their status as 
citizens and how they and people like themselves are likely to be treated by government.” 
Governance, the New Public Management and Changing Citizenship Regimes 
There are strong connections between governance debates and the visions of the new public 
management (NPM), as Guy Peters and John Pierre (1998) make clear. Governance models 
emphasize that networks, and not formal policy-making institutions in government, control 
policy, and therefore, as one of the main students of this approach puts it, there has been a 
“hollowing out of the state” (Rhodes, 1994). The private sector, both for-profit and not-for-
profit, takes on more responsibility for policy making and delivery, because of the loss of state 
legitimacy and in order to meet local needs. Of course, the state is hollowed-out but not elimi- 
nated, and it has some new resources. Rather than the power to decide, its strength is in its 
capacity to influence (Peters and Pierre, 1998: 226). Therefore, capacity to puzzle through (to 
use Hugh Heclo’s term) a policy agenda, to negotiate with a multitude of partners, and to 
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exercise leadership are the most valuable commodities. Actual institutional authority is less 
important. And finally, the governance models stress the need for a wide repertoire of policy 
instruments, indeed multiple instruments are appropriate, and may be more effective (Peters and 
Pierre, 1998: 227). 
The NPM adds to the governance model, among other things, an emphasis on output-control 
rather than input-control, and competition that makes the use of benchmarks essential. The NPM 
tends to be somewhat more aggressively anti-statist than the governance model, but both share 
an emphasis on leadership over formal authority, provide theories of democracy in which 
legitimacy takes precedence over formal rights, and in which horizontal and interconnecting rela- 
tions are valued over hierarchical ones. 
The public administrations and governmental institutions of Western Europe have had to adapt to 
the challenges of the increasingly popular NPM and notions of governance. Peters and Pierre 
(1998: 234ff.) review the various responses to these challenges for public administrations, 
especially the introduction of competition into service provision, which is a key element of the 
NPM, and they concluded in 1998 that the changes were widespread but somewhat limited 
(Peters and Pierre, 1998: 237). 
However, the same is not as true of the principles of governance. Citizenship regimes in a variety 
of different countries have been redesigned in significant ways according to the principles of the 
governance model. For example, in a comparison of France, Italy, Belgium, and Sweden as well 
as the EU, we observed that the four national governments had all made significant changes to 
their citizenship regime. Using the example of child care we found that responsibility mix was 
altered as markets were assigned more importance, as mechanism for setting service levels (for 
example, Sweden, France and Belgium), for creating choice (Belgium, France), for providing 
services (all four cases). In all cases, although to varying degrees, citizens’ right to child care 
services became less universal and more marketized, as access to services was provided via the 
tax system rather than as a universal public service, and then via non-profit as well as for-profit 
providers in a range of partnerships. Thus the presence of public funding for child care did not 
translate into a citizenship right; it often brought only some increased market capacity. Access to 
service was also differentiated by class, with class-divided programmes emerging in all cases. 
And finally, in all four national cases, the “national dimension” or standard of service gave way 
as regional authorities became more important in opening a right to service, providing access and 
so on; national territories were losing their organising imagery (Jenson and Sineau, 2001: 
Chapter 9 and passim). 
Other studies identify similar alterations in citizenship regimes, as governments develop new 
framework agreements with the voluntary sector. The part of the private sector composed of non-
profits or NGOs  in Canada, the UK, France, Germany and elsewhere have all been courted by 
governments seeking to establish new – and often contractual relations – with them (Phillips, 
2002). Moreover, patterns of access and routes to representation have been profoundly changed 
as new governance structures incorporate the voluntary sector and its expertise directly into the 
policy process (Laforest, 2002), thereby granting them legitimacy more because they are “ex- 
perts” able to engage in policy design and delivery than because they represent a particular 
constituency lobbying the state. In other words, their role in consultation and processes of 
engagement is highly valued.  
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Movement towards reliance on benchmarking and output indicators in countries from New 
Zealand to the UK all mark a change in the way that social citizenship is conceptualized. Rather 
than measuring social citizenship by what is offered or available to citizens, citizenship regimes 
under the influence of governance models emphasize the results, that is whether the target has 
been met. As part of the process there is a move towards result-based management while the 
language of rights has been altered to insist that citizens “of course have rights, but they also 
have responsibilities”, and the role of public authorities is to enable them to fulfill those respon- 
sibilities. 
In national situations this move towards a “governance model” and redesign of citizens’ rights 
and access, as well as the responsibility mix among the four sectors (states, markets, families and 
the voluntary sector), has been much debated by promoters – who see it as a positive response to 
the loss of legitimacy of politicians and governments – and opponents, who see it as undermining 
basic relationships of social citizenship and creating new patterns of marginalization, and 
therefore real reasons for citizens to be disaffected from their particular governments, if not 
government in general. 
Therefore, installing the new principles of a LEGO citizenship regime in various national 
settings has not been easy.9 In the EU, however, the hegemony of governance models (with 
tinges of NPM) is a real intellectual resource. It allows those engaged in “institutional self-
reflection” (Sbragia, 2002: 2) to avoid some of the pitfalls of existing institutional arrangements, 
while making claims and promises to improve governance in terms which are increasingly fa- 
miliar from cross-European, national and international discourses. 
The White Paper’s proposals for a new citizenship regime 
The White Paper proposes that the institutions of the European union innovate and engage in the 
Community method, which as was described above, as a decision-making process which con- 
tains all the usual elements of any policy process, even if the institutions do not directly cor- 
respond to the usual categories of government. In order to discuss the future, the White Paper 
sets out five principles of good governance: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness 
and coherence. 
If the EU and especially the Commission were to follow the proposals of the White Paper, it 
would be moving toward consolidating a “governance” style citizenship regime, with new forms 
of access, new rights of social citizenship and particularly with a new responsibility mix.  
The responsibility mix 
The White Paper on Governance’s proposals for a responsibility mix based on multilevel gover- 
nance, closer ties with sub-national levels of government and civil society organisations re- 
produce the mainstream practices of many governments engaged in redesigning their citizenship 
regimes. Governance models, as Peters and Pierre (1998) stress, include a structured mix based 
on networks and shared competences rather than on clear divisions of competences or powers, as 
mentioned above. The five principles of good governance, then - according to the White Paper – 
can be achieved only with a break from traditional governmental practice. “… the linear model 
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of dispensing policies from above must be replaced by a virtuous circle, based on feedback, 
networks and involvement from policy creation to implementation at all levels.” (Commission, 
2001: 11). 
In this shift, the White Paper assigns to the EU institutions (if not explicitly certainly between the 
lines) the status of “equal”. As Peters and Pierre (1998: 226) point out, governance arguments 
describe a situation in which “government actors now bargain as relative equals” with a range of 
other actors. EU institutions, as a non-government, can take advantage by enhancing their po- 
sition vis-à-vis the national governments, then, when the governance model is adopted. 
In all this, the voluntary sector as well as sub-national governments and market-based actors 
have a major role, building on partnerships (Commission, 2001: 32). Delivering better informa- 
tion – which is described as the foundation for openness and a “pre-condition for generating a 
sense of belonging to Europe” (Commission, 2001: 11) – will involve “networks, grassroots 
organisations and national, regional and local authorities.” In particular, and beyond the outreach 
to local and regional governments, the White Paper emphasises the importance of the voluntary 
sector, that which it labels “civil society”, and which includes everything from the social partners 
to NGOs and professional associations. Singled out are “churches and religious communities 
[that] have a particular contribution to make.” (Commission, 2001: 14). 
This new responsibility mix is quite explicitly detailed in a subsection entitled With better 
involvement comes greater responsibility, in which the statement is made that “participation is 
not about institutionalising protest. It is about more effective policy shaping on early consultation 
and past experience.” (Commission, 2001: 15). The White Paper goes into detail about the need 
to establish a code of conduct setting minimum standards (Commission, 2001: 17). It also calls 
on civil society to follow the same principles of good governance, especially accountability and 
openness (Commission, 2001: 15), because it is no longer simply a “private sector” but one 
engaged in public decisions. 
This call for increased consultation and involvement in policy design replicates the language of 
many jurisdictions that are structuring a new role for the state and voluntary sector in ways 
which alter usual notions of accountability as well as hierarchy as they restructure the 
responsibility mix of their citizenship regimes (Ullman, 1998; Peters and Pierre, 1998; Jenson, 
2002; Phillips, 2002). 
Access 
The second important change in thinking about citizenship that the White Paper proposes touches on 
routes to representation. Given its origins as a Common Market and so on, the European 
Community gave a privileged status to the social partners, represented by union and employer 
organisations. Indeed, their Treaty status as alternative sources of legislation is strong. The White 
Paper, however, downplays this special status, folding the social partners (as mentioned above) 
into the broad category of civil society. This potential loss of standing did not go unnoticed by 
the social partners, in their contributions to the White Paper process. In the Governance Lun- 
cheon of March 18th, 2001, for example, both the representatives of employers and of unions 
pointed out the need to maintain their status. 
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The White Paper does not reject the Social Dialogue process, of course. But it does stress the key 
contributions that networks linking businesses, communities, research centers and regional and 
local authorities can make to policy-making, particularly as “multipliers spreading awareness of 
the EU” (Commission, 2001: 18).  
An additional dimension of access that is important involves the issue of “for what”. Access of 
these networks, civil society organisations, local authorities, and so on are all intended to provide 
the institutions of the EU, and especially the Commission, with the capacity to live up to the 
principles of good governance. Thus, with the information fed to it by the structured consultation 
processes giving access to these civil society actors, the institutions of the EU will be able to 
generate the coherence which is one of the five principles, and thereby provide “political 
leadership” (Commission, 2001: 10). If the notion of the Commission and other institutions as 
policy innovators is not new (Ross, 1995), it is nonetheless the case that embedded in a 
governance model this leadership role gains a logic and legitimacy which it may not have had 
previously where it was a matter of “striving”. 
Thus, as national governments have moved from “rowing” to “steering” in their visions of the 
responsibility mix,10 they have become more similar to the self-styled role of the Commission, 
and thereby provide a shared language for talking of the role of levels of government. 
Rights and responsibilities 
The White Paper is not a document about social citizenship, and therefore it does not have much 
to say on the content of citizenship rights. It does, however, embrace the “output focus” of 
contemporary governance models much more than the notion of basic and standard citizenship 
rights that informed post-1945 citizenship regimes. Thus, the White Paper calls for greater flexi- 
bility in implementation, legislation limited as much as possible to “essential elements”, “leaving 
the executive to fill in the technical detail via implementing ‘secondary’ rules” (Commission, 
2001: 20). Again this implementation would involve the range of actors – not termed stake- 
holders in the White Paper but usually called that in the governance literature – mentioned 
above. These notions are underpinned by the call for greater flexibility, in which target-based, 
tripartite contracts would be employed, for achieving particular objectives under the umbrella of 
the “primary legislation” (Commission, 2001: 13). 
This idea of differential programme adhering to common general standards or norms is a familiar 
component of governance models, and directly challenges the model of strong, centralised 
government (Peters and Pierre, 1998: 224). Partnerships will vary according to who is involved, 
regional specificity meeting local needs is a positive value, and so on. Thus, governance thinking 
gives the principle of subsidiarity another leg for legitimacy (Commission, 2001: 10). 
Most relevant in this section is the commitment, in the White Paper, to the extension (as ap- 
propriate) of the Open Method of Coordination. The OMC is the EU’s version of output-based 
thinking par excellence. As it is extended and improved, the governance practices of the EU 
mimic as well as lead the national governments that are moving to the use of outcome indicators 
and measures as basic tools of public administration.11 
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As governments move to the use of these instruments, they are shifting the content of their 
citizenship regime, altering notions of equality as well as purpose, notions of responsibility of 
time, and so on.12 Therefore, again we note that with respect to the fashioning of citizenship 
rights the White Paper is close to documents produced and practices undertaken by national 
governments as well as international agencies. 
Belonging 
The White Paper begins from a concern about the belonging dimension of European citizenship. 
Dissatisfaction, disengagement, and distance plague European institutions, as they do national 
states. Therefore, the motive for reforming European governance, the reason for undertaking the 
exercise, is to reduce the fact that “many Europeans feel alienated from the Union’s work” 
(Commission, 2001: 7). Here the prescriptions for addressing citizen alienation is what we find 
in many other cases as well – greater public involvement, new forms of civic engagement and 
better social inclusion. In particular, policy must be more “inclusive and accountable” (Com- 
mission, 2001: 8). This turn to improving public involvement is a constant theme, especially in 
those countries where participation rates in elections have been steadily and dramatically de- 
clining.13 
Concerns about the belonging dimension underpin the White Paper, and therefore is provided as 
a justification for the proposals about the responsibility mix, access and so on. As the 
Concluding Section of the White Paper puts it:  
Alienation from politics is not just a European problem; it is global, national and local. 
But for the Union it presents a particular challenge. Given the deep level of integration 
already achieved, people have similar expectations for the Union as they have for 
domestic politics and political institutions. But the Union cannot develop and deliver 
policy in the same way as a national government; it must build on partnerships and rely 
on a wide range of actors. Expectations must be met in different ways (Commission, 
2001: 32). 
However, as this paper has begun to document, the governance proposals – and the impact they 
would have on a European citizenship regime if ever implemented – are not very different from 







1 For example, Ulrike Liebert, who holds a Jean Monnet Chair at the University of Bremen, defines the Community 
method as an alternative governance model to that proposed in the White Paper, which she characterises as “parti-
cipatory”. She labels the Community Method as “the ‘Monnet mode of governance.’ The mode of governance called 
after Jean Monnet was based on consensual decision-making by elites, and strategic economic instruments for 
political integration…” (Liebert, 2001: 7). It is secretive, rather than transparent, and so on. 
2 The White Paper goes out of its way to treat the EU as just another level of government. Thus, after identifying the 
five principles of good governance, the authors go on to say: “Each principle is important for establishing more 
democratic governance. They underpin democracy and the rule of law in the Member States, but they apply to all 
levels of government – global, European, national, regional and local.” (Commission, 2001: 10). 
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3 As John Peterson (2002: 72) writes, “The European Commission may be the strangest executive bureaucracy ever 
created. Despite claims that it can be understood using the accepted tools for analysing traditional bureaucracies… 
the Commission is in many respects a sui generis institution; there is nothing like it in any nation state or other 
international organisation.” For a detailed consideration of the Commission as a key source of innovation within the 
Community, unlike any other, see Ross (1995). 
4 Robert Putnam’s musings about Bowling Alone are only one example among many. 
5 This concept was developed in Jenson and Phillips (1996).   
6 The silence around such questions arose, no doubt, because of three tendencies: to see citizenship as part of nation-
building, and therefore to assume that a "national" identity results from the extension of rights; to take the 
"universalist" claims of citizenship discourse for reality, without realising that "second-class" citizens may exist; and 
to have a "society-centric" theory of the state, which does not attribute an "interest of state" to particular 
representations of citizens' identities. 
7 To this point, some alert readers may well notice the similarity between these elements of the definition and the 
“welfare regime” (Esping-Andersen, 1990). However, deploying the concept of “citizenship” is intended to allow 
consideration of more than using encompassed in analyses of welfare regimes, such as the identity dimensions and 
distributional patterns and so on described in the next sentences. 
8 This terminology is similar to that used by Esping-Andersen et al. (2001) in their report to the Belgian Presidency 
of the EU. However, instead of using the “welfare triangle” of state/market/family, we prefer to use the image of the 
“welfare diamond” of state/market/family/community proposed by, inter alia., Evers et.al. (1994). 
9 See Jenson (2002) and Jenson and Saint-Martin (2002) for the reasons to name the new regime a LEGO citizenship 
regime. 
10 As Peters and Pierre (1998: 231) put it: “Steering, in this perspective, is largely about setting priorities and 
defining goals.” 
11 The Social Union Framework Agreement (SUFA) signed by the federal, provincial and territorial governments of 
Canada (except Quebec) in 1998 is another example of a governmental shift to this form of governance. 
12 For a discussion see Jenson and Saint-Martin (2002) and Jenson (2002). 
13 For an overview of this response in national cases see Phillips with Orsini (2002). 
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